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Abstract: In this paper, we revisit the question of how domestic and foreign risks aﬀect
growth through the lens of an AK small-open economy model with risky borrowing/lending
and global diversification. Wealth is allocated between domestic and foreign assets and the
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small-open economy may choose to either borrow from abroad, despite the fact that this is
risky, or lend. In contrast to standard N -country models, whether growth is faster or slower
(and whether growth is more or less volatile) compared to autarky is not entirely driven
by relative risk aversion but also depends on the return and risk characteristics of domestic
and foreign assets. We also show that growth volatility and mean growth have typically
nonmonotonic relationships with the levels and correlation of domestic and foreign risks.
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21 Introduction
Globalization means both exposure to foreign shocks and risk diversification. A much
debated question is how financial globalization, in particular in the post-second world war
period, has aﬀected the average and volatility of growth rates in industrial and developing
countries. Empirical studies have so far delivered conflicting results. While Van Wincoop
[19] found that potential growth and welfare gains from international risk sharing arising
from financial globalization are sizeable, Kose et al. [6] observed that “cross-country con-
sumption correlations have not increased in the 1990s, precisely when financial integration
would have been expected to result in better risk-sharing opportunities, especially for de-
veloping countries”. Indeed, many authors have pointed at the risks conveyed by financial
globalization for less advanced economies, increasing macroeconomic instability being the
main argument put forward (see Stiglitz [18] or Schmukler [16]). More recently, a few rel-
atively robust findings have emerged. One is related to equity markets liberalization (in
contrast to the broad liberalization of the capital account), which is increasingly viewed as
growth-enhancing (see the extensive survey of Kose et al. [5]). On the other hand, there
is now a common view that financial liberalization may be beneficial or not depending
on whether the countries’ fundamentals are above certain threshold levels (see for example
Kose et al. [9]). In particular, it is nowadays broadly argued that financial and institutional
development should be above a certain level in order to reduce the risks associated with
financial openness.
We revisit this issue theoretically through the lens of an AK small open-economy model
in which the domestic country’s portfolio is optimally split between domestic and foreign
assets. All assets are supposed to be risky, for simplicity. As a result of the inherent op-
timal portfolio choice, mean growth and growth volatility are both endogenous and they
depend on the relative magnitude of domestic and foreign risks and on their correlation.
Within this framework, we examine the impact of financial globalization on growth on one
hand, and we inquire into how mean growth and growth volatility are related to the levels
of domestic and foreign risks and their correlation on the other. While our setting may
seem basic at first glance, it does generate a rich set of implications regarding the latter
issues. Because the small-open economy assumption is everything but irrelevant from an
empirical standpoint, especially because the issue of financial globalization is acute in many
developing countries, we do believe that our theoretical analysis is a useful complement to
the related literature, that we review below.
Key ingredients of our stochastic model are endogenous growth and international risk
sharing. As such, our analysis is closely related to several earlier contributions, among
which Devereux and Smith [3] and Obstfeld [12] are prominent examples. Both papers
study N -country models where each country selects its optimal portfolio of (domestic and
3international) assets. However, there is no aggregate risk in Devereux and Smith [3] since
they assume away aggregate uncertainty and focus on idiosyncratic national shocks. In
contrast, uncertainty does not vanish in the aggregate in Obstfeld’s [12] seminal paper, and
national risks may be correlated. We shall keep this essential feature in our framework
and devote part of our work to uncover the role of risks correlation in financial globaliza-
tion outcomes. Nonetheless, we depart from Obstfeld in the essential fact that we do not
consider N optimizing countries but only one small-open economy country facing exoge-
nous (and possibly correlated) risks arising from both domestic technology and the rest of
world’s through international financial markets. As argued above, the economic relevance
of such an alternative framework is out of question, as it applies to many developing (and
developed) countries.
With respect to the engine driving endogenous growth, while Devereux and Smith [3]
use Arrowian learning-by-doing, Obstfeld [12] uses a standard Merton-like optimal portfolio
model, though the main pro-liberalization argument is more in the vein of Romer’s increas-
ing number of varieties (see Romer [14]): growth is boosted when switching from autarky to
globalization because more assets become available and improve international risk sharing.
Mathematically however, Obstfeld’s model is a stochastic AK model like ours, and it in-
volves the same type of linear homogenous stochastic diﬀerential equations. See also Jones
and Manuelli [4], Steger [17] and Boucekkine et al. [1] for other analogous stochastic AK
modelings. On one hand, we simplify preferences and assume typical CRRA time-separable
utility, while Obstfeld introduces Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. On the other hand, one at-
tractive addition of our model is that foreign borrowing is supposed to be risky, which is
more in line with experiences in many countries that face uncertainty in the borrowing
cost. One extreme example of such risk is the well-documented “sudden stops” in capital
inflows. It turns out, as we show below, that such a realistic assumption aﬀects in a deep
way how financial globalization aﬀects growth and volatility.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. While whether or not financial global-
ization boosts average growth depends only on parameters governing the attitude towards
risk in Obstfeld’s N -country model with only risky assets, our model delivers a much more
contrasted picture. In our analysis, whether growth is faster or slower (and whether growth
is more or less volatile) compared to autarky is not entirely driven by relative risk aversion
but it also relates, more fundamentally, to the return and risk characteristics of domestic
and foreign assets. In particular, even if the small open economy is able to choose optimally
its allocation of wealth between domestic and foreign assets, it is conceivable that financial
integration leads to faster or slower mean growth depending both on the relative magnitude
of domestic risk and foreign risk and on their correlation. A key aspect of our analysis is
whether the country is a net borrower and lender towards the rest of the world, which itself
depends on the risk characteristics of domestic and foreign assets. For example, it can be
readily shown that if the domestic and foreign risks are equal in size (and have possibly
4nonzero correlation), moving from autarky to financial integration does raise mean growth
if the small open economy is a net borrower but is not necessarily growth-enhancing if the
economy is a net lender. On the other hand, growth variance can be larger or smaller after
the economy integrates, which contrasts with Obstfeld’s result that financial integration
unambiguously reduces volatility. In that sense, our results are broadly consistent with the
volatility-enhancing eﬀect of globalization outlined by the authors mentioned at the outset
of this introduction.
Diﬀerent from Obstfeld’s results, we uncover several possible parametric conditions un-
der which financial integration may induce more unstable growth compared to autarky.
These conditions amount to setting threshold values to deep parameters of the small open
economy, consistently with the recent empirical literature (see again the survey of Kose et
al. [5]). Therefore our results provide conditions that gives some theoretical flesh to the
instability argument put forward by several authors like Stiglitz or Schmukler (cited above),
who have been warning against financial liberalization in developing and medium-income
countries.
Another set of findings is obtained from the inspection of the relationship between mean
growth and growth volatility on one hand and the levels and correlation of domestic and
foreign risks on the other. Since the seminal empirical work of Ramey and Ramey [13],
the relationship between mean growth and growth volatility has been abundantly studied.
More recent evidence provided by Kose et al. [7, 8] show that such relationship has been
aﬀected by both trade and financial liberalization. In theory, though, few studies have
addressed the growth-volatility relationship in the context of international risk sharing and
our analysis hopefully contributes to filling this gap. This void is particularly acute regard-
ing how the correlation of risks can aﬀect growth and volatility. In several recent empirical
papers (see in particular Schmukler [16] for the case of developing countries), a meticulous
account of diﬀerent types of domestic and foreign risks conveyed by financial globalization
is performed. We propose here a complete analytical study of how the levels and correla-
tion of domestic and foreigns risks impact mean growth and growth volatility in the small
open AK economy. Just like the results on the shape of the latter as function of financial
openness, we also identify non-monotonic relationships and interpret them.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes the model and solves for the optimal
consumption and wealth allocation. Section 3 studies the eﬀects of financial globalization
(that is, moving from autarky to full integration into international financial markets) on
growth in the small-open economy. Section 4 shows that domestic and foreign risks have
nonmonotonic eﬀects on mean growth and growth variance. Finally, Section 5 gathers con-
cluding remarks and some proofs and additional material are exposed in two appendices.
52 Growth in a Small-Open Economy AK Model
We consider a stochastic extension of a simple small-open economy AK model. The
dynamics of domestic capital and external debt are described by the following equations:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
dK(t) = [I(t)− δK(t)] dt+ ηKK(t) dW (t)
dD(t) = [rD(t) + I(t) + C(t)−AK(t)] dt+ ηDD(t) dW˜ (t)
W˜ (t) = ωW (t) +√1− ω2W I(t)
(1)
where K(t), I(t) and C(t) represent, respectively, capital, investment in capital and ag-
gregate consumption at time t, D(t) represents the stock of debt at time t, with initial
conditions given by K(0) = K0 > 0 and D(0) = D0 with K0 > D0. In addition, productiv-
ity A, the world interest rate r and the rate of capital depreciation δ ≥ 0 are deterministic
parameters.
The first stochastic diﬀerential equation in (1) describes the accumulation of domestic
capital, while the second equation describes the evolution of debt that the home country
accumulates towards the rest of the world. Finally, the last equation in (1) describes the
risks structure. We are interested in situations such that the risk associated to the domestic
return may be correlated with the foreign return’s risk. More specifically, the two corre-
lated Brownian motions W and W˜ reflect random disturbances that can be thought of as
aﬀecting respectively the level of domestic productivity - domestic risk - and the level of
foreign productivity - foreign risk. To model the possible dependence, we assume that W
and W I are independent Brownian motions so that W and W˜ have their correlation equal
to parameter ω, while parameters ηK > 0 and ηD > 0 represent the respective standard
deviations of ηKW and of ηDW˜ . Although we assume away risk-free assets, for simplicity,
the analysis could be interestingly extended to account for the presence of domestic and/or
global safe assets.
The social planner maximizes the expected sum of discounted utility flows defined by:
E
^8 +∞
0
e−ρtC(t)
1−σ − 1
1− σ dt

(2)
where σ > 0 denotes relative risk aversion while ρ > 0 measures impatience. Following
the portfolio approach pioneered by Merton [11] and Samuelson [15], we now simplify the
problem of maximizing (2) under (1) by using the variable x(t) ≡ K(t)−D(t), which is the
country’s total wealth. In particular, we define β(t) as the fraction of wealth that is invested
domestically, that is, K(t) = β(t)x(t) and D(t) = (β(t) − 1)x(t). Taking the diﬀerence of
the two state equations in (1) gives the stochastic equation that describes the evolution of
x(t) in terms of β(t) and C(t):
dx(t) = [R(t)x(t)− C(t)] dt+ ηKβ(t)x(t) dW (t) + ηD(1− β(t))x(t) dW˜ (t) (3)
6where R(t) ≡ (A − δ)β(t) + r(1 − β(t)) is the return of the portfolio that is composed
of domestic and foreign assets and is optimized upon. The initial condition is given by
x(0) = x0 = K0−D0 > 0. Then maximizing (2) subject to (1) choosing positive {I(·), C(·)}
is equivalent to maximizing (2) subject to (3) choosing {β(·), C(·)} among all couples of
processes that are adapted to the filtration generated byW and W˜ while ensuring that x(t),
β(t) and C(t) are all almost surely positive for any t ≥ 0. Choosing the latter formulation,
we denote by v the value function of the problem, i.e. the maximal attainable utility given
the initial condition x0 > 0:
v(x0) ≡ max{β(·),C(·)}E
^8 +∞
0
e−ρtC(t)
1−σ − 1
1− σ dt

. (4)
The following proposition derives the explicit solution to the above problem, which we will
extensively use to address the main questions of this paper.
Proposition 2.1 (Optimal Consumption and Wealth Allocation)
The optimal share of investment in the domestic asset is constant and given by:
β(t) = βM = (A− δ − r)/ση2K + η2D − 2ωηDηK +
η2D − ωηDηK
η2K + η2D − 2ωηDηK . (5)
It follows that βM > 1, that is, the country is a net debtor if and only if:
A− δ − r
σηK > ηK − ωηD. (6)
The value function in terms of initial wealth x0 = K0 −D0 > 0 is given by:
v(x0) =
1
1− σ
F
γ (x0)1−σ − 1ρ
k
with
γ =
F
1
σ [ρ+ (σ − 1)ΣM ]
k−σ
> 0 (7)
and
ΣM = RM − 1
2
σ

η2Kβ2M + η2D(1− βM )2 + 2ωβM (1− βM )ηKηD
=
(8)
where RM ≡ (A−δ)βM+r(1−βM ) denotes the deterministic return of the optimal portfolio.
At each time t ≥ 0 the optimal consumption is a constant fraction of wealth:
C(t) = γ−1/σx(t) (9)
The optimal trajectory of wealth x(t) is the unique solution of the following stochastic dif-
ferential equation:
dx(t) =

(A− δ)βM + r(1− βM )− γ−1/σ
=
x(t) dt
+ηKβMx(t) dW (t) + ηD(1− βM )x(t) dW˜ (t)
(10)
7The economy follows a balanced-growth path for all t ≥ 0 such that all variables grow at
the same optimal growth rate g, which is normally distributed with variance V[g] and mean
E[g] given by:
V[g] = η2Kβ2M + η2D(1− βM )2 + 2ωβM (1− βM )ηKηD (11)
E[g] =
(A− δ)βM + r(1− βM )− ρ
σ +
(σ − 2)
2
V[g] (12)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that, not surprisingly, the expression of mean growth in (12) is the sum of a de-
terministic component, that is, (RM − ρ)/σ, and a second term that reflects the stochastic
feature of the model. One may at first sight be surprised that the latter term depends on
(σ − 2) and not on (σ − 1) as in most papers in the literature (e.g. Jones and Manuelli [4],
Steger [17]). This is because we define mean growth as the average growth rate of wealth,
which is the relevant notion if the issue of stochastic stability is addressed, as it should. In
contrast, the literature usually defines mean growth as the growth rate of average wealth
(see Boucekkine, Pintus and Zou [2] for a discussion). It is easily shown, using Jensen’s
inequality, that the former definition implies a smaller mean growth rate than the latter.
In the context of our model, this means that an additional term - that is, V[g]/2 - ham-
pers growth and alters the growth/volatility relationship compared to conventional wisdom
based on a disputable definition of mean growth.
A few comments about the optimal allocation of consumption and wealth are in order.
In view of its expression in (8), ΣM can be thought of as the certainty equivalent return on
the country’s portfolio, that is, the diﬀerence between the portfolio’s deterministic return
RM and the risk premium σV[g]/2. From equation (9), optimal consumption is a fixed
fraction of wealth. In view of the expressions in (7)-(8), we conclude that the presence of
risk, materialized by the risk premium term in (8), has an ambiguous eﬀect on consumption
and savings. In particular, the average propensity to consume γ−1/σ is lower, other things
equal, under risk if and only if σ > 1. As is well known, this is because the (negative)
income eﬀect of the fall in return due to risk dominates the substitution eﬀect when σ > 1.
Regarding the wealth allocation between domestic and foreign assets, the condition
that β(t) = βM must be positive can now be expressed, in view of expression (5), as
A− δ− r+ σ(η2D − ωηDηK) > 0. Note that when βM = 1 then the economy is closed, that
is, all wealth is invested domestically and the expression in (12) reduces to that derived
in Steger [17], in a setting where growth volatility is exogenous. In other words, if the
economy is in autarky, the variance of the growth rate is given by parameter ηK because
there is no access to diversification strategies. In our model growth volatility is endogenous
because it depends on the country’s portfolio allocation. Note that if foreign risk vanishes,
that is, ηD = 0, the expressions of mean growth and growth volatility collapse to those
8derived in Obstfeld [12] (provided, however, that mean growth is defined as the growth rate
of average wealth).
In addition, the condition expressed in (6) has a simple interpretation if one defines the
ratio S ≡ (A− δ − r)/[σ(η2K − ωηKηD)] as an adjusted Sharpe ratio, that is, the diﬀerence
in the risk-adjusted returns. Fixing domestic risk ηK and foreign risk ηD, two cases occur
depending on risks correlation. If ηK − ωηD is positive, that is, if correlation is negative
or positive but small enough then (6) means that the domestic economy will borrow from
the rest of the world and invest more domestically provided that adjusted Sharpe ratio is
larger than one. For instance, if risks are not correlated, that is, if ω = 0, then the domestic
economy requires a positive diﬀerence in deterministic returns to borrow from the rest of
the world. If, to the contrary, ηK − ωηD is negative, which essentially implies that risks
correlation is large enough, then the domestic economy will still choose to be a net debtor
even if the diﬀerence in deterministic returns is negative, provided that this diﬀerence is not
too negative. In other words, because a large positive correlation improves diversification,
the domestic economy will be a net borrower even if the domestic return is smaller than
the foreign return. In that case, the adjusted Sharpe ratio has to be smaller than one.
Note that our definition of the adjusted Sharpe ratio S ≡ (A− δ − r)/[σ(η2K − ωηKηD)]
accounts not only for risks correlation but also for relative risk aversion. Other things
equal, the larger risk aversion the riskier domestic investment appears, from a subjective
preference viewpoint. Moreover, the variance - rather than the standard deviation - of risk
appears in its denominator, in contrast to the standard definition of the Sharpe ratio.
The relationship between average growth and growth volatility depicted in (12) allows
to interpret the optimal portfolio decision in an intuitive way. It is not diﬃcult to get that
the optimal share of domestic investment in total wealth obtains by maximizing a mean-
variance criterium. More precisely, replacing the expression of the variance from equation
(11) into (12) and then finding the value of βM that maximizes E[g] − (σ−1)2 V[g] yields
the expression of βM in equation (5). This means that growth is driven by the optimal
allocation of risk between domestic investment and international lending or borrowing.
We now investigate the two important questions outlined in the introduction: (i) in this
framework, what are the conditions such that financial globalization fosters growth in a
small open economy and how does volatility adjust? (ii) how domestic and foreign risks
aﬀect the shape of the relationship between mean growth and growth volatility? We start
with the former topic.
93 The Growth Eﬀects of Financial Globalization
Because both the mean and the variance of growth depend on βM , and given the optimal
portfolio characterization stated in Proposition 2.1, the study of growth and volatility eﬀects
of globalization and the associated comparative statics turn out to be quite cumbersome
so our strategy unfolds in two separate steps. We first examine the case such that the
domestic economy diﬀers from the rest of the world in terms of deterministic return but
faces the same level of exogenous risk, what we call the capital deepening/exporting eﬀect.
Second, we consider a situation such that the deterministic components of domestic and
foreign returns are equal while the domestic economy is exposed to a level of risk that diﬀers
from the level of foreign risk, what we call the pure diversification eﬀect. Before developing
such an analysis, a preliminary remark. It is not diﬃcult to show that, absent any frictions
or market imperfections, financial globalization improves welfare in our setting, as already
noticed by the literature.
3.1 The Capital Deepening/Exporting Eﬀect on Growth when Domestic
and Foreign Risks Are Equal
In this section, we focus on the capital deepening/exporting eﬀect of financial glob-
alization by assuming that the levels of domestic and foreign risks are equal, that is,
ηK = ηD. This means that whether the country imports or exports capital depends on
the diﬀerence between deterministic returns, that is, A− δ − r, but also on the correlation
ω which matters as well, as we now show. Because the adjusted Sharpe ratio simplifies to
S ≡ (A− δ − r)/[ση2K(1− ω)] when ηK = ηD, the expression in (5) simplifies to:
βM = 1
2
(1 + S) (13)
which essentially says that the home country will invest more than half of its wealth in the
domestic asset if and only if S > 0 or equivalently A − δ > r, that is, when the domestic
deterministic return exceeds the foreign return. The condition that βM > 0 is now S > −1
and the following proposition derives the conditions such that the domestic country either
lends to or borrows from the rest of the world.
Proposition 3.1 (External Position and Capital Deepening/Exporting)
Assume that ηK = ηD, that is, domestic and foreign assets bear the same risk so that the
adjusted Sharpe ratio is S = (A− δ − r)/[ση2K(1 − ω)]. In addition, assume that S > −1.
Then βM > 0, the fraction of wealth invested domestically, is an increasing function of
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risks correlation ω and a decreasing function of risk ηK if and only if S > 0 or equivalently
A − δ > r, that is, if and only if the domestic deterministic return exceeds the foreign
deterministic return.
In addition, the following holds.
(i) if S > 1 then βM > 1, that is, the domestic country is a net borrower to the rest of the
world.
(ii) if S = 1 then βM = 1, that is, the domestic country neither lends nor borrows.
(iii) if S < 1 then the domestic country is a net lender.
The comparative statics of βM with respect to common risk ηK (and to σ for that
matter) is rather straightforward: the smaller risk, the larger the fraction of wealth invested
domestically whenever the domestic asset’s return dominates. As for risks correlation ω,
here again, the intuition is that the larger the correlation between domestic and foreign
risks, the smaller the threshold value of the diﬀerence in deterministic returns above which
the country to become a net debtor.
We are now in a position to answer the question of how financial integration aﬀects the
mean and variance of the growth rate. We first focus on the conventional case with σ ≥ 1.
Autarky obtains when βM = 1, which implies that mean growth and growth variance are
given respectively by E[ga] =
A−δ−ρ
σ +
(σ−2)
2 V[g
a] with of course V[ga] = η2K .
Proposition 3.2 (Growth Eﬀect of Global Diversification)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1, suppose that σ ≥ 1. Then the following holds.
(i) The variance of the growth rate V[g] attained under global diversification is larger than
the variance of the autarkic growth rate if and only if the country is a net borrower, that
is, if and only if βM > 1.
(ii) The mean growth rate E[g] attained under global diversification is larger than the au-
tarkic growth rate if βM > 1, that is, if the country is a net borrower. On the other hand,
if 1 > βM > 0, that is, if the country is a net lender, then the mean growth rate under
financial globalization is, compared to autarky, smaller if and only if 1 > S > 2/σ − 1 and
larger if and only if S < 2/σ − 1.
Proposition 3.2 clearly shows that even if the home country is able to choose optimally
its allocation of wealth between domestic and foreign assets, it is conceivable that financial
integration has ambiguous eﬀects on mean growth and growth variability. More precisely,
the capital deepening/exporting eﬀect tends to increase mean growth and growth volatility
compared to autarky for countries that are net borrowers towards the rest of the world.
On the other hand, while creditor countries enjoys a lower growth variance when opening
up, they can at the same time benefits from faster mean growth or suﬀers from slower
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mean growth depending on whether the adjusted Sharpe ratio is smaller or larger than a
threshold value. With a value for relative risk aversion set to the conventional value of 2,
this threshold equals 0. Therefore, this condition tells us that the domestic country that
is optimally integrated and is a net creditor would experience slower growth compared to
autarky if the diﬀerence in deterministic returns is smaller than 1 times adjusted risk but
positive. When the diﬀerence in deterministic returns becomes negative (but still is larger
than −1 times adjusted risk as required for βM to be positive), then the open domestic
economy benefits from faster mean growth compared to autarky, just like the borrowing
country.
This result is broadly consistent with empirical studies stressing threshold eﬀects of fi-
nancial globalization (see for example Kose et al. [9]). Indeed, in our AK setting, domestic
returns (which depends mainly on parameters A) capture not only the technological state
of the economy but also all other determinants of productivity, including institutional ar-
rangements. Our study delivers a threshold value on these returns, which depends on the
risk characteristics of the environment faced by the small-open economy, a quite natural
outcome. In contrast, Devereux and Smith [3] and Obstfeld [12] show that whether or not
financial globalization boosts growth depends only on preferences through σ. For instance,
a typical result in those papers is that growth goes down when σ > 1 when, as in our set-
ting, only risky assets are held. Proposition 3.2 delivers for the small-open economy a much
more contrasted picture since even when σ is larger than one, mean growth and growth
volatility can go up or down following financial integration. We believe our results may
be seen as a first step towards providing some theoretical foundations for the empirically
documented fact that how globalization aﬀects growth is subject to threshold eﬀect.
To summarize, the eﬀect of financial globalization on mean growth is highly nonmono-
tonic under the pure capital deepening/exporting eﬀect. In contrast, growth volatility
moves in a monotonic way with the domestic country’s external position so that debtor
countries face a larger variance of the growth rate while creditor countries benefit from
lower growth volatility, compared to autarky. Similarly, the case with 1 > σ also leads to
a nonmonotonic relationship between openness and growth. However, we do not report re-
sults arising in that case, for sake of brevity, and instead turn to a more detailed comparison
of our results with those in the existing literature.
3.2 The Growth Eﬀect of Financial Globalization: Small Open Economy
vs N-Country World
The purpose of this section is to compare the results presented in Section 3.1, that pertain
to a small-open economy, with the growth eﬀects of financial globalization that Obstfeld
[12] derives from a N -country model. As stated in the introduction, besides the obvious
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fact that the world interest rate is independent of what happens in the small open economy,
another key diﬀerence is that foreign borrowing is risky in our economy because the world
interest rate is subject to random disturbances. This is an arguably reasonable assumption
for many small countries that have to cope with variations in the cost of foreign borrowing.
In contrast the setting developed in Obstfeld [12] assumes that countries lend to each-other
only through risk-free bonds.
Obstfeld [12] develops two examples with two symmetric countries that face the same
level of uncertainty. This is exactly the assumption regarding risks that we use in Section
3.1 so we now present examples along the same lines in order to illustrate the diﬀerences
between our model and Obstfeld’s.1 As argued by Obstfeld, example 1 relies on a risk level
that lies within the range of values typically experienced by developing countries, while
example 2 assumes a much lower risk that corresponds to the historical experience of richer
countries. In addition, we compare outcomes arising when relative risk aversion is smaller
or larger than unity.
Example 1 (high risk/developing country): risk aversion is set at σ = 1.5 while A − δ =
0.05 and r = ρ = 0.02. In addition, ηK = ηD = 0.1, so that growth variance is 1% under
autarky. This we take to be our high risk/developing country example. How much growth
and volatility change when the economy integrates is reported in Table 1a.
Table 1a. Average Growth (Top Panel) and Growth Variance (Bottom Panel) in
Small-Open Economy and N -Country Models - Example 1a
E[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 2.25% 2.25%
Integration 2.12% 3.63%
V[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 1.0% 1.0%
Integration 0.5% 2.5%
Table 1a shows that, in example 1a, both models have very diﬀerent implications. Ob-
stfeld’s setting produces a slight reduction in the mean growth rate after integration. Our
1More precisely, our examples are small variations of examples 1 and 2 in Obstfeld [12, p. 1318-19], in
which we ensure that only risky assets are held both in autarky and under financial integration, just as
in our analysis. Since Obstfeld uses Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences, we impose that relative risk aversion
coincides with the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity to make results comparable. Unlike
in the other parts of this paper, to ease comparison we of course use the same definition of mean growth as
Obstfeld’s. See Boucekkine, Pintus and Zou [2] for an alternative and a thorough discussion in the context
of Obstfeld’s model.
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small-open economy model, in sharp contrast, predicts that financial integration originates
large growth gains: compared to Obstfeld’s, the growth rate is 1.52 percentage points
higher. This is because in our model the globally integrated economy has access to foreign
borrowing - and not just investment in foreign assets. Given that the domestic return is
larger than the borrowing cost and that both the asset and the liability have the same risk,
the integrated economy actually borrows a significant amount, which boosts investment in
domestic capital and thereby growth. Example 1a implies that βM = 1.5, which translates
into a debt-to-capital ratio of 33%. Diﬀerently, in Obstfeld’s example with two symmet-
ric countries holding identical shares of the global mutual fund, there is no net borrowing
between countries. In addition, we should stress that the diﬀerence in predictions are not
due to the world - safe - interest rate going up by a large margin in Obstfeld’s model. In
example 1a, this increase turns out not to be large, from 3.5% to 4.2%.
Further unreported results show that both models share predictions regarding how fi-
nancial integration aﬀects both the consumption-to-wealth ratio and the correlation be-
tween average growth and growth volatility. In example 1a, σ = 1.5 implies that the
consumption-to-wealth goes up after integration, for the usual reason that the substitution
eﬀect is dominated by the income eﬀect. In addition, both models predict that, in example
1a, average growth and growth volatility go hand in hand, which is not inconsistent with
evidence for more financially integrated countries (“emerging countries”, see Kose et al.
[8]). However, while integration decreases mean growth and growth volatility in Obstfeld’s
N -country model, our small-open economy predicts that, in sharp contrast, globalization
pushes up growth and volatility: because borrowing is risky, relying more on foreign credit
is good for average growth but also inevitably triggers larger growth volatility, in line with
the experience of emerging markets.
What happens if relative risk aversion is smaller than one? Table 1b reports how growth
changes when σ = 0.75 while all other parameters are unchanged.
Table 1b. Average Growth (Top Panel) and Growth Variance (Bottom Panel) in
Small-Open Economy and N -Country Models - Example 1b
E[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 3.87% 3.87%
Integration 4.62% 8.93%
V[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 1.0% 1.0%
Integration 0.5% 8.5%
Both models now predict that growth goes up after integration, but the growth rate
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increase is much larger in our model. More importantly, while growth and volatility move
in opposite directions due to integration in Obstfeld’s setting, our model delivers a positive
correlation, which is more in line with empirical evidence about emerging markets.2 Note
that in both models, the consumption-to-wealth ratio goes down when σ < 1 since the
substitution eﬀect then dominates, which explains why the growth rate goes up in Obtfeld’s
setting. In example 1b we get βM = 2.5, which means that the debt-to-capital ratio equals
60%. We now turn to our low-risk/developed country example.
Example 2 (low risk/developed country): when risk aversion is σ = 1.5, A − δ = 0.025,
r = ρ = 0.02, and ηK = ηD = 0.02, the growth eﬀects of financial globalization are as
reported in Table 2a.
Table 2a. Average Growth (Top Panel) and Growth Variance (Bottom Panel) in
Small-Open Economy and N -Country Models - Example 2a
E[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 0.34% 0.34%
Integration 0.33% 1.91%
V[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 0.04% 0.04%
Integration 0.02% 1.41%
Here also, Table 2a shows that while Obstfeld’s model predicts a modest decline in mean
growth, our model delivers a large increase in the growth rate. This is again because
it is optimal for the small open economy to be a net borrower in example 2, just as in
example 1. Both models still predict a positive growth/volatility relationship, in line with
the experience of OECD countries, though growth and volatility go up in our model and
down in Obstfeld’s.
To complete our comparison, we report in Table 2b what happens when σ = 0.75 while
other parameters do not change.
2Although one would think that a negative correlation is in line with empirical evidence, as reported
e.g. in Ramey and Ramey [13], one should keep in mind that a breakdown of estimates shows a positive
correlation for industrialized countries and even a reversal of negative correlation after globalization for
some developing countries - those that are more financially integrated, see Kose et al. [7, 8].
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Table 2b. Average Growth (Top Panel) and Growth Variance (Bottom Panel) in
Small-Open Economy and N -Country Models - Example 2b
E[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 0.66% 0.66%
Integration 0.67% 5.19%
V[g] Obstfeld model Our model
Autarky 0.04% 0.04%
Integration 0.02% 5.57%
Table 2b delivers conclusions that are similar to those in Table 1b: similarly, growth in-
creases by a significant margin in our model, which also predicts a positive growth/volatility
relationship, unlike Obstfeld’s. Here again, diﬀerences between both model’s predictions
are not driven by a large increase in the world interest rate that occurs after integration
in Obstfeld’s model. In example 2, this increase is at most 3 basis point. What makes a
diﬀerence is that our model economy borrows a lot, and even more in example 2 compared
to example 1: debt-to-capital ratios are equal to 79% and 89% under the parameter values
that determine Tables 2a and 2b, respectively.
The main lesson from both examples is that our small-open economy model predicts
that financial globalization has diﬀerent eﬀects on growth and volatility, both in direction
and magnitude, compared to the seminal N -country model developed by Obstfeld [12].
Diﬀerent predictions arise, as illustrated by examples 1 and 2, because of an arguably at-
tractive feature of the model: a globally integrated economy is likely to resort to foreign
borrowing, even if the latter is risky, so as to finance investment and boost growth. Though
globalization leads to both faster and more volatile growth, it is conceivable that such a
combination is an optimal choice. Many - small - real-world economies that are indeed
net debtor towards the rest of the world have been through large swings under the spell of
volatile capital inflows.
3.3 The Pure Diversification Eﬀect on Growth when Domestic and For-
eign Deterministic Returns Are Equal
In this section we assume that investing domestically and internationally earn the same
deterministic return, that is, A − δ = r. This allows us to focus on how the relative
strength of domestic risk relative to foreign risk impacts the mean and volatility of growth,
as opposed to the capital deepening/exporting eﬀect of financial globalization. Although
the deterministic returns are supposed to be equalized, therefore, the level of domestic risk
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can diﬀer from that of foreign risk and both risks may still be correlated, positively or
negatively.
When A− δ = r, (5) simplifies to:
βM = λ(λ− ω)
1 + λ2 − 2ωλ . (14)
where we define λ ≡ ηD/ηK as the ratio between foreign and domestic risks.
An interesting benchmark case occurs when domestic and foreign risks are equal, that is,
when λ = 1. In that case, as can be seen by looking at the expression in (14), one has that
βM = 1/2: the domestic country allocates half of its wealth in domestic asset and half in
foreign asset, independent of the correlation between foreign and domestic risk. However,
correlation matters when domestic risk and foreign risk are not one and the same thing, as
we now show.
We still do not allow short positions on the domestic asset, hence we assume that λ > ω
so that βM > 0. The interpretation of this condition is here again that external debt cannot
be larger than the stock of domestic capital. We get the following result:
Proposition 3.3 (External Position and Pure Diversification)
Assume that A−δ = r, that is, domestic and international assets earn the same determin-
istic return, and λ ≡ ηD/ηK > ω, that is, external debt is smaller than domestic capital so
that βM > 0. Then the following holds.
(i) if 1 > λ, that is, if domestic risk is larger than foreign risk, then βM is a decreasing
function of risks correlation ω and 1 > βM , that is, the domestic country is a net lender to
the rest of the world, independent of ω.
(ii) if λ > 1, that is, if domestic risk is smaller than foreign risk, then βM is an increasing
function of risks correlation ω and:
(a) if 1 ≥ ω > 1/λ then βM > 1, that is, the domestic country is a net borrower when
risks correlation is large enough,
(b) if ω = 1/λ then βM = 1, that is, the domestic country neither lends nor borrows,
(c) if 1/λ > ω ≥ −1 then βM < 1, that is, the domestic country is a net lender when
the risks correlation is small enough.
Case (i) in Proposition 3.3 has a trivial interpretation: given that domestic and foreign
assets have equal returns, the small-open economy optimally chooses to be a net lender
whenever domestic risk is larger than foreign risk.
The interpretation of case (ii) in Proposition 3.3 is that, when λ > 1, the domestic
country borrows from the rest of the world only if the correlation between domestic risk
and foreign risk is positive and large enough. In that case, for example, a fall in domestic
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TFP is associated with a decrease in the world interest rate. But then the loss of resources
generated by the productivity slowdown are compensated by a fall in debt service, which
helps to smooth consumption. Conversely, when domestic and foreign risks are negatively
correlated or have a weak positive correlation, the country has incentives to lend to the rest
of the world. Case (ii) of Proposition 3.3 shows that the threshold value for ω above which
the domestic country is a net debtor is given by ηK/ηD. If domestic risk is shut down, that
is, ηK = 0, then the economy becomes autarkic, that is, βM = 1. Now if domestic risk is
slightly positive but still smaller than foreign risk, it makes sense for the country to lend
if correlation is negative and to borrow if correlation is positive. The larger domestic risk
compared to foreign risk, the more correlated the risks should be for the domestic country
to be willing to borrow. Finally, because βM is a ratio of second-order polynomials in
ηK , how the fraction invested in the domestic asset depends on foreign risk depends in a
a nonmonotonic way on all parameters. Instead of reporting results along those lines, we
simply mention that βM is either a hump-shaped, a U-shaped or a S-shaped function of
ηK .
The next proposition establishes how financial globalization aﬀects mean growth and
growth volatility, with the expression E[g] =
r−ρ
σ +
(σ−2)
2 V[g] obtained from equation (12)
when A−δ = r. In addition, plugging the expression of βM from equation (14) into equation
(11), one gets a simple expression for the growth rate variance:
V[g] =
(1− ω2)η2Dη2K
η2K + η2D − 2ωηDηK (15)
Note that, rather trivially, growth volatility vanishes in the extreme cases with perfect
correlation, that is, either ω = 1 or ω = 1. This is because perfect hedging against risk is
possible in those two corner cases, given that domestic and foreign deterministic returns
are supposed to be equal.
Proposition 3.4 (Growth Eﬀect of Global Diversification)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.3, the following holds.
(i) The variance of the growth rate V[g] is, under financial globalization with optimal di-
versification, smaller than the variance of the autarkic growth rate.
(ii) The mean growth rate E[g] is, under financial globalization with optimal diversification,
smaller than the autarkic growth rate if and only of σ > 2.
In accord with intuition, Proposition 3.4 states that, under equal deterministic returns
from domestic and foreign assets, global diversification helps reducing variance. This is the
pure diversification eﬀect. Therefore, under the condition that the income eﬀect triggered
by risk strongly dominates the substitution eﬀect - that is, when σ > 2 - mean growth
moves in the same direction as growth volatility.
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4 The Non-Monotonic Eﬀects of Domestic and Foreign Risks
on the Average and Volatility of Growth
We now focus on how the structure of risks aﬀect growth and volatility. As in the
previous section, we may study the eﬀects of domestic and foreign risks on growth in two
steps. We report here the results corresponding to the pure diversification case, that is,
when the domestic and foreign risks are of diﬀerent size, which is one interesting case from
the economic point of view. The case of the capital deepening/exporting eﬀect is reported
in Appendix B. Both cases deliver the same qualitative results (hump-shaped relationships
between mean growth and volatility and the risk parameters) and rely on similar economic
interpretations.
Let us thus examine what are the growth eﬀects of domestic and foreign risks when
A − δ = r, which amounts to isolating the pure diversification eﬀect. As explained in
Section 3.2, one gets that βM = λ(λ−ω)1+λ2−2ωλ , where λ ≡ ηD/ηK . It turns out that V[g] is a
hump-shaped function of risks correlation when ηD > ηK , as illustrated in the Figure 1.
Figure 1: Variance of Growth Rate V[g] against Risks Correlation ω
Case (ii) of Proposition 3.3
The intuition behind Figure 1 is the following. With perfect, negative correlation ω = −1,
the country can lend just enough to diversify risks away. Moving away from perfect, negative
correlation increases variance up to the point where the country becomes a net debtor, in
which case variance goes down until, in the limit, risks are again diversified away when they
are perfectly, positively correlated (ω = 1). In addition, the expression of growth variance
in (15) enables us to show that V[g] is also a hump-shaped function of foreign risk ηD when
ηD > ηK and a similar intuition holds.
Summarizing the results on growth variance and mean growth, one gets the following
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proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Growth Eﬀect of Domestic and Foreign Risks)
(i) Under the assumptions of case (i) in Proposition 3.3, the variance of the growth rate
V[g] is an increasing function of both risks correlation ω and of foreign risk ηD. It follows
that:
(a) if σ > 2, mean growth E[g] is also an increasing function of ω and of ηD,
(b) if σ = 2, E[g] is independent of ω and of ηD,
(c) if σ < 2, E[g] is a decreasing function of ω and of ηD.
(ii) Under the assumptions of case (ii) in Proposition 3.3, the variance of the growth rate
V[g] is a hump-shaped function of both risks correlation ω and of foreign risk ηD, as illus-
trated in Figure 1.
It follows that:
(a) if σ > 2, mean growth E[g] is also a hump-shaped function of ω and of ηD,
(b) if σ = 2, E[g] is independent of ω and of ηD,
(c) if σ < 2, E[g] is a U-shaped function of ω and of ηD.
It is clear from Proposition 4.1 that an increase in either foreign risk or risks correla-
tion has opposite eﬀects on the variance and the mean of the growth rate only if σ < 2.
In that case, for example, an increasing correlation between domestic and foreign risks -
that can be interpreted as associated to a wave of deeper globalization that leads to more
synchronized fluctuations across countries - leads to two opposite phases: initially, mean
growth goes down while growth volatility increases until this pattern reverses, with growth
volatility going down and mean growth going up. In contrast, when σ > 2, mean growth
and growth variance move together, first up when correlation increases from −1 then down
when correlation crosses a positive threshold.
On the other hand, case (i) of Proposition 3.3 shows that the country is a net lender
whenever ηK > ηD. The fact that the country does not borrow comes from our assumption
that ω cannot be larger that ηD/ηK , for if that would be true it is easy to show that βM
would be negative and the country would choose to go short on its domestic capital stock.
If ηD/ηK > ω then, it follows that whenever domestic risk is larger than foreign risk, both
mean growth and growth volatility are monotonic functions of risks correlation. Of course,
whether mean growth and growth volatility move together or not depends on whether σ is
larger or smaller than 2.
As already noticed, in qualitative terms similar nonmonotonic relationships arise under
the capital deepening/exporting eﬀect, as shown in Appendix B. However, direct com-
parison of Propositions 4.1 and B.1 reveals that the directions of those relationships may
or may not be aligned under the pure diversification eﬀect and under the capital deepen-
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ing/exporting eﬀect. This means that those two forces could, when combined, result in
stronger nonlinearities. In other words, the nonmonotonicities arising in the full model of
Section 2 are expected to be even stronger than those reported in this section and Appendix
B.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have revisited theoretically the growth consequences of financial open-
ness through the lens of an AK small-open economy model. We believe that this is a
useful complement to the growth literature which connects to global diversification and
international risk sharing. In particular, an attractive feature of our model is that it allows,
quite realistically, foreign borrowing to be risky. Diﬀerent from the typical wisdom that
has been derived from standard N -country models of global diversification a` la Devereux-
Smith-Obstfeld, we have shown that how financial globalization aﬀects growth and volatility
depends on both preferences and the structure of risk in the small open economy case: in-
tegration may either slow down or stimulate growth depending on the interaction between
relative risk aversion, on the one hand, and the return and risk characteristics of domestic
and foreign assets, on the other hand. Last but not least, we have also provided with a
full theoretical characterization of the shapes of the relationships between growth volatility
and mean growth and the levels and correlation of domestic and foreign risks, which is to
a certain extent novel. We believe that our results are broadly consistent with available
empirical studies that stress threshold eﬀects, especially for developing countries.
Although a careful calibration and empirical test of the model are beyond the scope of
this paper, we would like to point at the fact that our setting delivers a number of testable
implications. For example, Kose et al. [7] document how a measure of correlation that is
not too far from our model’s notion has been time-varying since the 1960’s. Relatedly, our
model predicts that variations in risks correlation could account for how growth and volatil-
ity - and their correlation - have changed over time over the last half-century, in particular
after economies have opted for financial integration. Similarly, the evolution through time
of what is “exogenous” risk in our model has also a direct impact on average growth and
growth variance. To take just one example, actual changes in economic policies and other
relevant institutions that aﬀect countries’ productivities are expected to aﬀect growth in
our model that has testable implications in that respect. An exploration along those lines
seems promising to us and should be the topic of further research. In addition, although
our model assumes that the demand for foreign borrowing is always satisfied in the small-
open economy, preliminary and unreported results show that it could easily be amended to
account for credit market frictions that put some limitation on available credit. Such an
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extension would allow not only to investigate how growth and volatility, on one hand, and
welfare, on the other, are aﬀected under financial globalization but also to revisit the issue
of “sudden stops” in an endogenous growth setting, thus completing the literature that has
largely focused on business-cycle models.
Finally, at a more theoretical level, our portfolio approach to the eﬀect of financial global-
ization would be enriched by the addition of mechanisms that endogenize risks correlation,
for example along the lines of Mastuyama et al. [10] who show how trade integration leads
to more synchronized movements of productivities in open economies (see also Kose et al.
[6] for some related empirics). Because trade integration has typically preceded financial
integration in many countries, such a combination would help explain how actual - and
counterfactual - globalization sequences aﬀect growth and volatility and why such an im-
pact has no reason to be uniform across countries, as documented by numerous empirical
studies. This also calls, in our view, for further research.
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A Proof of Proposition 2.1
The current value Hamiltonian of the system is given by
HCV (x, C, β, p, q) = [(A− δ)βx+ r(1− β)x− C] p+ C1−σ−11−σ
+12qx
2(η2Kβ2 + η2D(1− β)2 + 2ωηKηDβ(1− β))
= HCCV (x, C, p, q) +H
β
CV (x,β, p, q)
=
+
−Cp+ C1−σ−11−σ

+ [(A− δ)βx+ r(1− β)x]p+ 12qx2[η2Kβ2 + η2D(1− β)2 + 2ωηKηDβ(1− β)]
(16)
We define the maximum value Hamiltonian as:
H(x, p, q) := max
C≥0,β∈RHCV (x, C, β, p, q).
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We look for a function v:R→ R that solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the
system, that is
ρv(x)−H(x, vI(x), vII(x)) = 0. (17)
We look for a solution of the form
v(x) =
γx1−σ − 1ρ
1− σ (18)
for some positive γ (γ positive even if σ > 1, in that case the term 1− σ is negative and v
is negative). In this case we have
vI(x) = γx−σ
and
vII(x) = −σγx−1−σ.
Since C and β appear in the current value Hamiltonian in the distinct terms HCCV and HβCV
(as described in (16)) we can easily find the C and the β that maximize HCV . The value
of the maximizing C is given by
CM := argmax
C≥0
HCCV (x,C, v
I(x), vII(x)) = (vI(x))−1/σ = γ−1/σx (19)
so that
HCCV (x,CM , γx−σ,−σγx−1−σ) =
C1−σM −1
1−σ − CMγx−σ = σ1−σγ1−
1
σx1−σ − 11−σ .
(20)
The expressions of the β that maximizes the current value Hamiltonian is given by
βM := argmaxβ∈R H
β
CV (x,β, vI(x), vII(x)).
Since the expression of HβCV (x,β, p, q) as a function of β is simply a parabola one can easily
see, taking the derivative in β of HβCV , that βM needs to satisfy
0 = (−δ − r +A)γx1−σ + 1
2
x1−σ(−σγ)

2η2KβM + 2(βM − 1)η2D − 2ωηKηDβM + 2ωηDηK
=
that is
βM = 1σ
(A− δ − r) + σ(η2D − ωηKηD)
η2K + η2D − 2ωηKηD . (21)
Putting everything together we have that an expression of the form given by (18) is a
solution for (17) if and only if
ργx1−σ−
1
ρ
1−σ −H(x, γx−σ,−σγx−1−σ)
= ργx1−σ− 1ρ1−σ −HCCV (x,CM , γx−σ,−σγx−1−σ)−
HβCV (x,βM , γx−σ,−σγx−1−σ) = 0
(22)
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i.e.
ργx1−σ− 1ρ1−σ −
 σ
1−σγ1−
1
σx1−σ − 11−σ
=
− (AβM − δβM − r(βM − 1)) γx1−σ
−12
Dσγx1−σi Jη2Kβ2M + η2D(1− βM )2 + 2ωηKηDβM (1− βM )
o
= 0
(23)
where βM is given by (21). If we denote by
ΣM := {(AβM − δβM − r(βM − 1))
−12σ
Jη2Kβ2M + η2D(1− βM )2 + 2ωηKηDβM (1− βM )
o}, (24)
then (23) is verified for any x is and only if
ρ
1− σ −
σ
1− σγ
−1/σ − ΣM = 0
and then
γ =
w ρ
σ −
1− σ
σ ΣM
W−σ
. (25)
Then the function v(x) =
γx1−σ− 1ρ
1−σ is a smooth solution of the HJB equation associated
to the optimal control problem. One can then conclude using the general theory (see for
example Chapter 5 and in particular Theorem 5.1 page 268 of Yong and Zhou, 1999) that
v(x) is indeed the value function of the problem and that the feedback induced by v
C,β =
p
argmaxC≥0HCCV (x,C, v
I(x), vII(x)), argmaxβ∈RHβCV (x,β, vI(x), vII(x))
Q
=
w
γ−1/σx, 1σ (A−δ−r)+σ(η
2
D−ωηKηD)η2K+η2D−2ωηKηD
W (26)
is in fact optimal. Equation (10) is a straightforward corollary of this fact.
Finally, from (10) it follows that
V[g] = η2Kβ2M + η2D(1− βM )2 + 2ωβM (1− βM )ηKηD (27)
E[g] = (A− δ)βM + r(1− βM )− γ−1/σ − 1
2
V[g] (28)
Plugging the expressions of γ appearing in (25) in terms of the parameters and βM we get
that the mean and variance of growth are related through the following equation:
E[g] =
(A− δ)βM + r(1− βM )− ρ
σ +
(σ − 2)
2
V[g] (29)
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B Nonmonotonic Growth Eﬀects when Domestic and For-
eign Risks Are Equal
As in Section 3.1 assume that the levels of domestic and foreign risks are equal, that is,
ηK = ηD, which amounts to isolating the capital deepening eﬀect. In such a case, one gets
βM = 12(1+S), and the positivity of the adjusted Sharpe ratio is equivalent to the domestic
deterministic return exceeding the foreign return as explained in Section 3.1. Replacing βM
by the expression above in the optimal expression of growth volatility and mean growth
given by (11) and (12) under ηK = ηD, one can readily establish how the levels of risk and
correlation impact growth.
Proposition B.1 (Growth Eﬀect of Domestic and Foreign Risks)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1, the following holds.
(i)V[g] is an increasing function of risks correlation ω, that is, the more correlated domestic
and foreign risks, the larger growth volatility. On the other hand, E[g] is an increasing
function of risks correlation ω if and only if S2 > 2/σ − 1, which holds if σ > 2.
(ii) E[g] and V[g] are U-shaped functions of the level of risk ηK. More precisely, E[g] goes
up with ηK if and only if:
S2 >
wσ − 2
1 + σ
Ww
1 + ω
1− ω
W
which is satisfied when σ < 2, while V[g] goes up with ηK if and only if:
S2 >
1 + ω
1− ω
Therefore, mean growth and growth volatility decrease with increasing risk when risk is
low. In contrast, when risk is large enough, mean growth and growth volatility increase
with increasing risk.
